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*Cuba*  
October 25, 1962

TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM EUR - William R. Tyler  
S/P - W. W. Rostow  
NEA - Philip Talbot  
SUBJECT: Cuba

DECLASSIFIED  
NER 75-123 side 10th 6/75  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), or (E)  
By WPM HARS, Date 7/24/75

1. This memorandum suggests a course of diplomatic action which:

(a) might assist a peaceful resolution of the present crisis;

(b) would permit us to go forward with our own constructive track in regard to alliance nuclear matters and arms control.

We will submit a longer memorandum of discussion, elaborating on the suggestion, if this would be helpful.

2. We should instruct Ambassador Finletter to continue NAC's current consideration of the sea-based multilateral MREB concept in such a way as to provide a plausible occasion for the Turkish and Italian statements proposed under 3, below.

3. We should urge the Turkish and Italian governments to use this discussion to record what we take to be their intent: i.e., their desire to phase out IREB's when it is clear that the multilateral force will come into being -- especially since Polaris and other US external forces will provide needed coverage in the meantime.

4. In any negotiations with the Soviets, we should demand immediate removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba, in return for no US action other than lifting of the blockade. We should make clear, if pressed, that we do not

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recognize any relation between this issue and Turkish or Italian IRBM's. If removal of offensive weapons from Cuba fits into a larger arms control scheme at all, it should be in the context of a Latin American nuclear free zone.

5. The US should also indicate that it is prepared to enter into arms control negotiations simultaneously with Cuban negotiations, and that it is prepared in this connection:

- (a) to exchange non-diffusion declarations with the USSR;
- (b) to exchange declarations with the USSR not to facilitate procurement for new national deployment of MRBM's on the territory of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries outside the US and USSR (based on the previously stated US intent only to facilitate MRBM procurement for a multilateral sea-based force); and possibly to accompany any such exchange by a statement of our desire to respect the stated intention of the Turkish and Italian governments regarding IRBM's;
- (c) to agree to safeguards against war by miscalculation, e.g., facilities for direct communication and exchange of emergency observation teams.